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FROM THE ‘GOVERNANCE OF SECURITY’ 
TO ‘GOVERNANCE FAILURE’:  
REFINING THE CRIMINOLOGICAL 
AGENDA 
 





Over the past three decades, an on-going debate has developed around the ways and 
extent to which the hierarchical, state-led provision of security and policing has been 
displaced by a move toward a polycentric, network-oriented mode of governance. 
This paper, firstly, analytically reconstructs the debate, suggesting that it is 
characterised by descriptive concordance, explanatory confluence, and normative 
dissonance. In other words, the major area of contention has been around the social 
and political implications of the State’s decentring by a networked provision of 
security, a transition that is accepted as having actually taken place. It is argued, 
secondly, that the debate has neglected to some considerable extent the inherent 
functional (as opposed to normative) limitations of networked governance, and that all 
parties to the debate may have been somewhat precipitous in accepting that such 
modes for delivering security can be functionally efficacious. Drawing on social 
theoretical explorations of ‘governance failure’, I identify three distinctive failure 
tendencies inherent in nodal networks, and evaluate their implications for the wider 
debate on the future of security provision. 
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The changing character of policing and security has been a central feature of 
criminological debate over the past quarter century. Starting perhaps with Shearing 
and Stenning’s (1981) landmark account of the privatisation of policing, the 
reconfiguration of mechanisms through which security is delivered has become a 
notable focus of criminological debate (and, indeed, dispute). Many influential voices 
within the discipline have devoted considerable time, energy and attention to 
describing, explaining and evaluating the implications of trends identified 
conceptually under the various labels of ‘privatisation’, ‘pluralisation’, ‘multi-
lateralisation’,  ‘network governance’ and ‘nodal governance’. Whilst there are 
manifold differences (both subtle and profound) across the accounts offered, they 
might be characterised as falling into one of two broad categories. The first, 
associated most clearly with the work of Shearing, Stenning, Bayley, Johnston and 
Wood, takes a rather sceptical view of ‘state-centric’ efforts to provide security, and 
sees in the emergence of network governance an opportunity to more effectively 
respond to community needs, control, coordination and accountability (see, for 
example, Shearing 1992; Johnston 1992; Bayley and Shearing 1996; Johnston and 
Shearing 2003; Wood and Shearing 2006). The second, perhaps most closely 
associated with the likes of Loader, Walker and Zedneri, adopts a more critical 
normative and evaluative stance in the face of the aforementioned developments, 
identifying in the receding role of the state a number of political and social problems, 
including those of democratic accountability, legitimacy, and social equity in the 
distribution of security as a social good (see, for example, Loader 2000, 2002; Loader 
and Walker 2001, 2004, 2006, 2007; Zedner 2006a, 2006b, 2007) . However, despite 
a range of explanatory and evaluative disagreements, contributors to the debate tend 
to be largely united in their descriptive appreciation that transformation has occurred 
and that policing and security are, for good or ill, now delivered by a dispersed 
network through which governance is effectedii. In this article, I argue that what has 
perhaps been crucially neglected amidst the explanatory and evaluative disputation is 
a more careful consideration of the functional limitations of network governance as 
such. In other words, I suggest that the dominant trajectory of the debate has tended to 
assume that the transition has occurred and been functionally efficacious in 
engendering a new mode of policing or securing (irrespective of its desirability), and 
so turned attention to issues of explanation  (why has it occurred?) and evaluation 
(what are its social and human benefits or costs?). As Wood and Dupont (2006: 1) put 
it, ‘there is more agreement about what has been happening than there is about what 
to do about it’. Amidst this descriptive agreement and prescriptive disagreement, 
relatively little attention has been devoted to considering the ways in which the 
network logic of governance may in and of itself be functionally (as opposed to 
normatively, politically or morally) problematic (for partial consideration of this 
problem, albeit not clearly framed within the conceptual language of network 
governance per se, see Hughes and McLaughlin 2003 and Hope and Kardtedt 2003). I 
seek to introduce such a dimension to the debate by carefully considering what we 
might learn through the concept of ‘governance failure’, as pioneered in the social 
theory of Bob Jessop (see Jessop 1998, 2000, 2003a, 2003b, 2004). Without this 
sociologically functional appreciation of the limits to governance, I suggest, the 
ongoing discussion of crime and policing remains in a crucial sense incomplete. 
 
Internet Journal of Criminology © 2011 
 ISSN 2045-6743 (Online) 
 
www.internetjournalofcriminology.com 3 
The article is structured into three substantive sections. In the first part, I briefly trace 
the development of the criminological debate around the transformation of policing 
and security, identify its key descriptive and explanatory parameters, and examine the 
ways in which the conceptual and analytical language of governance has been 
imported from cognate disciplines such as sociology and political science. In the 
second, I examine what appears to be the basic schism within the debate, which I 
suggest is fundamentally normative in character, turning as its does upon the socio-
political evaluation of new security arrangements, and their compatibility (or 
otherwise) with the vision of a just, equitable and democratic society. In the third 
section, I attempt to outline the missing element from the debate, a careful 
consideration of the functional (rather than political or moral) limitations of network 
governance, and argue that such a mode of social coordination is equally vulnerable to 
failure as its counterparts of hierarchy (state-led, top-down) and anarchy (distribution 
mediated via economic exchange in the market). Insofar as such inherent problems of 
failure have not been recognised within the criminological debate, criminology is 
liable to misrecognise its object of analysis (by assuming the functional efficacy of 
network governance) and the implications it may carry for the delivery of security qua 
social good.   
 
Policing, Security and Governance Through Networks 
 
Identifying the starting point for a particular debate or line of enquiry is beset with 
problems, as one can always locate antecedents that have decisively influenced and 
shaped any given contribution. The discussion of emergent phenomena of ‘private 
security’ and ‘private justice’ can certainly be traced back to the early 1970s at least 
(see, for example, Scott and McPherson 1971). However, it would not be unduly 
controversial to suggest that concerted criminological interest in such matters was 
decisively stimulated by the publication and reception of Shearing and Stenning’s 
lengthy 1981 article on ‘Modern Private Security: Its Growth and Implications’. In 
this piece the authors identify in the post WWII era a ‘quiet revolution in the policing 
and social control systems of many countries of the world’ (1981: 193). The 
revolution comprises the incremental expansion of private provisions for security, 
largely focused upon ‘protection against depredation’ (Ibid; 195) – what in more 
recent discussion has been characterised as a shift from ‘post-crime’ or ex-post facto 
reaction to a ‘pre-crime’, preventive logic of action (see Zedner 2007). Provocatively, 
the authors see in such developments a redemption of the Peelian dream of ‘a truly 
preventative police force’, albeit realised ‘through private security rather than the 
public police' (Shearing and Stenning, 1981: 217). Also interesting here is that, firstly, 
the authors move beyond viewing policing or security in the narrow terms of 
administrative law enforcement, and instead understand such efforts as an integral 
element of a wider process of social control. Secondly, and equally noteworthy, is that 
they connect the developments in question to Foucault’s analysis of the ‘disciplinary 
society’ and the dispersal of mechanisms of control across an ever broadening surface 
of social space (what Foucault (1991[1977]) famously dubs the ‘carceral archipelago’ 
of modernity). Thus, even at the inception of the criminological debate on the 
transformation of policing and security, it is situated in terms congruent to that later 
framed in terms of governance, which also draws its conceptual and analytical cues 
from Foucault’s reflections on the changing nature of power. 
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The descriptive and analytical contours noted above were further elaborated in 
subsequent work by Shearing and his collaborators (see Shearing and Stenning 1983; 
Shearing 1992; Bayley and Shearing 1996). Here they go further in challenging the 
‘state-centric’ view of social control as primarily a phenomenon or epiphenomenon of 
centralised state power, a position they attribute to the likes of Cohen (1979). Private 
security is differentiated from that furnished by the public agencies of the state along 
a number of significant dimensions including: its non-specialised character; its 
mandate defined by clients; and its eschewal of retributive sanctions and moral 
judgements in favour of an instrumental and preventative logic of action (Shearing 
and Stenning 1983: 498-502; the latter akin to what Feeley and Simon (1994) would 
dub the logic of ‘actuarial justice’ and which find policy application in the form of 
situational crime prevention). Further orienting to a Foucaldian analysis, they see 
control not as a heteronomous imposition upon subjects, but as an internalised logic of 
social interaction in which ‘members of the communities in which it operates are 
simultaneously watchers and watched’ (Ibid: 504). As such ‘control is at once 
pervasive and minute; it takes the form of small, seemingly insignificant observations 
and remedies that take place everywhere’ (ibid) – akin to Foucault’s ‘micro-physics of 
power’. These changes are, they conclude, tantamount to ‘new strategies of 
governance’ that are coming to define the nature of social control in contemporary 
societies as such. 
 
The analytical language of governance can be seen to gain a defining hold upon 
criminological discussion of policing and security through the 1990s and into the new 
millennium. The initial flurry of interest in the concept was, as suggested above, tied 
very much to the specific sociological and philosophical analytics of power developed 
by Foucault, which took issue not only with the earlier Marxian focus upon the state 
as the locus and instrument of ruling class domination (see, inter alia, Althusser 1994) 
but also the preoccupations with centralised government evident in mainstream 
Anglo-American political science. This trend was further consolidated by landmark 
contributions such as Stan Cohen’s (1985) book Visions of Social Control, which 
provided a sweeping account of the past, present and future of social control strategies 
in Western societies, built upon Foucault’s implantation-dispersal-capillary model of 
power as a technology of ontological production (see Foucault 2000). A similar 
contribution can be identified in the work of neo-Foucaldian social theorist Nikolas 
Rose, most particularly his books Governing the Soul (1991) and Powers of Freedom 
(1999) However, during the same period, a much more pragmatic, policy-oriented 
exploration of governance was starting to emerge not in sociology or post-structuralist 
philosophy, but in the fields of public administration and organisational studies. Here, 
the concept of governance was tied to the idea of multi-party policy networks 
(spanning public, private and voluntary sectors) which came together in order to 
effect functions of social-coordination or ‘steering’ (Rhodes 2007). Governance here 
refers to ‘changed conditions of ordered rule’ (Rhodes 1996: 652-3) such that 
outcomes previously effected through government actions are now achieved through 
different processes occurring outside the institutions of the nation state. As such, 
governance is viewed as occurring in an institutional ‘mesospace’ located between the 
macro-level of the state and the micro-level of the individual (Messner 1997). Such 
governance networks supposedly furnish mechanisms of social coordination and 
‘regularisation’ of behaviour other than those ‘traditionally’ instantiated either by the 
hierarchy of the state or the anarchy of the market. This conception of networks of 
governance is undoubtedly closely akin to that which has been operationalised in 
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crime control and social policy circles in the form of multi-agency ‘partnerships’ 
between statutory, voluntary and commercial agencies and in community safety and 
crime reduction initiatives (for discussion see Edwards and Hughes 2002; Hope 
2004). A third and equally influential version of network governance is that 
appropriated from Castell’s work on the globalised ‘network society’ (Castells 1996). 
The origin of Castell’s vision of networks lies in his earlier work in urban sociology 
and his ‘neo-Marxist’ analysis of the conditions under which urban social movements 
might become effective as agents of meaningful change (Castells 1992; for discussion 
see Stalder 2006, chpt 1). However, in his later work, the network logic becomes the 
dominant morphology for systems of governance as such.  
 
These different strands of governance theory had come together by the mid-1990s in 
criminological discussions of social control, policing and security2. Thus Garland 
(1996: 454) talks of a ‘new form of governance-at-a-distance, which represents…a 
new mode of exercising power. It is a new mode of governing crime…’ Similarly, 
Loader and Sparks (2002: 83) discuss the ‘contemporary landscapes of crime, order, 
and control’ in terms of ‘contemporary shifts in the character of governance’ 
amounting to ‘the fragmentation and diffusion of power’ (ibid: 87).  Shearing also 
makes explicit use of Castells' terminology not only of networks, but also of ‘nodes’, 
the distributed ‘points’ within a network at/through which knowledge and capacities 
for action are localized (Shearing, 2006: 26-8). Security is a good that consequently 
flows through the manifold nodes that are its ‘auspices and providers’ (Ibid: 27). All 
of the foregoing serves to attest that the criminological discourse, at least for the 
foreseeable future, appears to have been decisively reframed within a network 
governance paradigm, and there is (as Wood and Dupont note) considerable 
‘agreement about what has been happening’. However, we must move from the 
descriptive and analytical to the explanatory dimensions of the debate to better 
understand its contours. 
 
At the level of explanation, accounts of the ‘new’ governance of security exhibit 
considerable variation. It is not so much that all parties proffer distinctive explanatory 
hypotheses, as that they draw upon a wide range of causal inferences that are 
variously meso-, macro-, and meta-level in terms of scale, and alternate between or 
combine structural and cultural elements. Amongst the first such explanations offered 
was that of Shearing et al, which focused upon the post WWII expansion of ‘mass 
private property’ as the stimulus of the new preventative assemblage (Shearing and 
Stenning 1981: 226-9; Shearing and Stenning 1983: 496-7; Bayley and Shearing 
1996: 601). Alongside this, they offered a ‘supplemental’ cause in the (perceived 
and/or real) failure of state policing and security endeavours to stem an inexorable 
upward trend in crime, predation and incivility (Shearing and Stenning 1981; also 
Loader and Sparks 2002: 85). The latter has also been linked to a supposed 
intensification in the ‘fear of crime’, as a new reflexive ‘risk consciousness’ incites 
social actors to institute a host or precautionary measures aimed at staving off the 
possibility of criminal predation (see Shearing 1992: 412; Bayley and Shearing 1996: 
598-600; Garland 1996: 446-8; Loader and Sparks 2002: 94-5, 99). Other supposed 
                                                 
2
  There are, of course, other inspirations for network analysis in the social sciences, especially 
those emanating from complexity science (see Byrne 1998; Urry 2003) and actor-network theory (see 
Law and Hassard, 1999; Latour 2005). However, insofar as such perspectives appear marginal in their 
influence (at least in any direct sense) upon criminological debates around the governance of security, 
they have been omitted from the present discussion. 
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causal antecedents include a cultural individualisation that frays social bonds of 
solidarity (Bayley and Shearing 1996: 600; Garland 2002: 89-92); a globalisation 
process that creates a crisis for the sovereign state, which finds itself ‘hollowed out’ 
as its governmental capacity becomes distributed variously across sub- and supra-
national levels (Loader and Sparks 2002: 95-7; also discussion of ‘hollowing out’ of 
the nation state in Holliday 2000 and Jessop 2004); and the transition to ‘neo-
liberalism’ as the accumulation regime of contemporary capitalism, which crucially 
tends toward the privatisation and deregulation of policing and security (McLaughlin 
and Murji 2000: 104-5).  At the meta-theoretical level, the likes of Garland (2002) 
identify the ultimate cause of these changes in a wholesale and epochal shift of social 
formation from modernity to ‘late modernity’ (also Young 1999 and discussion in Yar 
and Penna 2004) or even ‘postmodernity’ (see, for example, Reiner 1992 and 
Sheptycki 1995). This range of explanatory propositions are often mobilised in 
combination, or used as synonyms for the selfsame processes, and there appears to be 
considerable confusion as to which stand in a relation of explanatory primacy to 
others (for example, is neo-liberalism an effect of the transition to late modernity, an 
integral element of late modernity as a totality of elements, or the driving force behind 
its manifestation? Does cultural change drive structural transformation, vice versa, or 
are the two indissolubly intertwined? Is the ‘hollowing out’ of the state caused by 
globalisation or is globalisation a consequence of the attenuation of the state’s 
governing capacities? And so on). However, what matters most for the purposes of 
the present discussion is that such explanatory conundrums appear to be less than 
central to the debate; most contributors are content to remark upon the complexity and 
variety of explanatory possibilities, yet acknowledge that in some form or other most 
(if not all) such claims have something to offer our understanding of why the present 
reconfiguration of security has taken place (see for example Loader and Sparks 2002: 
85-6). Thus while there is descriptive accordance in the debate, we might suggest that 
there is also explanatory confluence  (by which I mean that there is a coagulation or 
clustering of different explanatory propositions that intersect without any clear lines 
of division amongst contributors, and that differences as to which combination of 
factors are adduced appears not to structure the debate to a significant degree). As I 
shall elaborate in the next section, the most important line of discussion appears to 
centre not upon descriptive or explanatory problems, but upon normative and 
prescriptive issues, where there is considerable dissonance. 
 
Normative Dissonance: Or, What’s the Problem with the Network Governance of 
Security? 
The normative-political (evaluative and prescriptive) issues raised by the 
transformation of policing and security have been the most conspicuous and 
intractable features of the debate in recent years. Indeed, it would not be unfair to 
suggest that from its inception, the debate has viewed the problem of the ‘new 
policing and security’ not only in descriptive or explanatory, but also in normative 
terms. In other words, from the outset the problem has been not only to furnish an 
adequate social scientific account of what has happened and why, but also as to 
grapple with its potentially problematic social consequences. Thus Shearing and 
Stenning (1981: 193) defined the parameters of debate by identifying ‘fundamental 
questions with respect to sovereignty, justice and individual liberty’ arising from the 
changes they describe and explain. Questions of justice have been framed not least as 
problems of equity in the accessibility of security as a social good, in conditions under 
which it is increasingly made available via commercial and contractual relations. In 
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such circumstances, the citizen becomes a market consumer, which raises the question 
of how equity of access can be assured for the most financially disadvantaged 
individuals and communities (Bayley and Shearing 1996: 593-5). Issues of liberty 
relate to disciplinary and exclusionary consequences of micro-strategies of control 
apparent under the dispersal of social control via multiple agents within security 
networks (akin to problems of surveillance and privacy, as well as tendencies toward 
‘net widening’ and ‘mesh thinning’- Cohen 1985). Issues of legitimacy and 
accountability arise in that dispersed and often commercially contracted providers of 
security functions are accountable either to paying clients or other sectional interests, 
rather than socially responsible to the citizenry or polity.  
 
These problems have largely served to orient the recent debate, with different clusters 
of normative assessment emerging in light of such issues. At the risk of reductionism, 
we can suggest that Shearing and his collaborators (both together and individually) 
have seen these problems as surmountable within the framework of network 
governance. Thus, for example, Bayley and Shearing (1996: 603-4) propose to rectify 
problems of equity by awarding poor communities ‘block grants’ by means of which 
they could commercially contract security. As time has gone on, this coalition of 
scholars appears to have come to pragmatically accept (if not clearly endorse) the new 
security assemblage, seeing it as (at least potentially) a more effective mechanism for 
safeguarding persons and property against predation, especially as they reluctantly 
conclude that ‘governments cannot provide satisfactory public safety’ (Ibid: 601). The 
state, from a (regrettably) failing agent of security provision has come to be seen as 
itself a potential obstacle in the equitable provision of security, most especially 
through its insistence upon reasserting its erstwhile governmental, top-down and 
hierarchical responsibilities. Thus Shearing (2006: 30-1) argues for a ‘radical 
decentralization of governance’ and sees as a block ‘the very firm hold that states 
insist on maintaining over the direction of governance for the weak’. In this way, 
there has been a decisive move from a descriptive and analytical appreciation of the 
contemporary state’s incremental ‘incapacitation’, to a normative imperative that 
states should surrender such aspirations and make way for decentralised, network-
nodal mediation of security and analogous social goods (see also Johnston and 
Shearing (2003) for their endorsement of the nodal governance of security, which, as 
Loader and Walker (2004: 224) point out, appears to relegate the state from a position 
of ‘conceptual priority’ not only in analytical but also normative terms).  This position 
is summarised by Johnston (2006: 34): 
 
‘there are no immutable contradictions between the objectives of commercial, civil and 
collective partners. Thus, as regards security governance, it is necessary to consider how, in a 
market economy, mechanisms can be established to ensure that the collective good is 
protected in security networks made up partly of commercial elements’ 
 
This is not to suggest that these authors see no role for the state in the provision and 
governance of security; on the contrary, they view the state as an ongoing and 
necessary contributor to governance activities. However, they do argue that the state 
neither can, nor ought, to be allocated a privileged position within such arrangements, 
and that it must take its place within a ‘polycentric’ network of inter-dependent actors. 
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In distinction to the above reception of network or nodal governance, other scholars 
(most especially Loader, Walker and Zedner) have taken a far more politically 
sceptical stance. Loader (1997: 386-88) for example presents an explicit normative 
challenge to market provision of policing and security, arguing variously that (i) 
security is (and should be) intimately connected to questions of political legitimacy 
and accountability, such that its forms and provisions must be referred to democratic 
and public authorisation; (ii) that it is a ‘social good’ central to the maintenance of 
solidarity and civil bonds, and that its referral to market provision fragments this 
‘indivisibility’ (akin to Hope and Karstedt’s (2003) argument about the ‘death of the 
social’ in contemporary crime prevention agendas); and (iii) that as a scarce resource 
questions of its optimal allocation should be matters of collective deliberation rather 
than private choices by unequal consumers within a market. Loader and Walker 
(2006, 2007) build upon this assessment by positing security as (qua Michael Walzer) 
a ‘thick’ public good whose provision necessitates the continued involvement of the 
state as an ‘anchoring’ institution, and thus countering attempts to relegate it to a 
position of equivalence as just one node amongst many others in a network of 
governance. Taking a somewhat different (yet complimentary) tack, Crawford (2006) 
mobilises the economic theory of ‘public’ versus ‘club’ goods to argue that 
contemporary market-mediated security provisions inevitably tend towards 
‘enclosures’ of the privileged and secured from the under-privileged and unsecured, 
and as such are inimical to both solidarity and social justice (for an earlier application 
of the concept of ‘club goods’ to private policing, see Hope, 2000). Likewise, Zedner 
(2007) discerns a fundamental collision between private interests and the public good, 
such that the dispersal of security provision across private as well as public domains 
constitutes a corrosion of social justice, in which the provision of security ‘for all’ 
ought to be an irreducible element. Thus, for this ‘group’ of thinkers, the problem of 
network policing and security lies in the fundamental iniquities of outcome when 
viewed from the standpoint of a political commitment to equality, democracy and 
justice. 
 
All of the foregoing serves to suggest that the recent debate has been largely 
configured around a normative schism or dissonance arising from different 
evaluations of security as a social good. My aim here is not, however, to take a ‘turn’ 
in the debate and advocate one or other normative reception of network governance as 
it pertains to the new security environment. This is not to claim that such debate is 
unimportant – far from it, as any criminology purporting to engage with social 
problems as a means of promoting the public good (and which eschews the pseudo-
scientific rhetoric of narrowly technical and administrative ‘problem solving’) must of 
necessity grapple with the human consequences of contemporary developments in this 
field. However, to repeat, expounding upon such a position is not the aim of this 
paper. Rather, the goal is to argue that amidst the descriptive accordance, explanatory 
confluence and normative dissonance, something important may have been missed in 
the discussion of network governance. This missing element turns on the functional 
(as opposed to political) problems of governance as such when viewed as a mode of 
social coordination or regularisation. Contributions to the ongoing criminological 
debate tend to by and large assume that network governance is functionally 
efficacious as a mechanism for delivering security, irrespective of any localised 
difficulties or ‘blockages’ (as noted by Shearing) or iniquitous outcomes (as argued 
by Loader et al). While the criminological discussion of governance has been 
voluminous (only a small proportion of the books, book chapters and journal articles 
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on this topic have been cited in the present piece), nowhere in the literature has any 
serious or concerted consideration been given to the inherent functional limits of 
network governance. For example, Chapter 5 of Wood and Shearing (2006) is initially 
promising, given that its title is ‘Responding to Governance Deficits’; however, it 
transpires that it does not deal with any deficits inherent in governance as a mode of 
social coordination, but rather with the more specific (albeit important) normative 
problem of asymmetry faced by ‘weak nodes’ within networked governance 
structures. The extended elaboration of ‘governance failure’ developed over the past 
decade by Jessop (1998, 2000, 2003a, 2003b, 2004) finds not a single reference in the 
criminological discussion of governance, despite its impact within cognate disciplines 
such as sociology, political science, and political economy. This is not to say that 
problems of the kind identified by Jessop have gone entirely unacknowledged – we 
find, here and there, some discussion of the operational limits of governance networks 
(see, for example, Hughes and McLaughlin’s (2003) consideration of the instability 
encountered when attempting to constitute ‘community’ as a site or node of 
governance; Zedner’s (2006b) analysis of ‘capture’ within regulatory frameworks; 
and Hope and Karstedt’s (2003) consideration of problems of both coordinating 
action and of trust in crime prevention partnerships). However, such reflections have 
thus far appeared in a piecemeal manner, and lacking unity within an underlying or 
systematic analytical framework. In this remainder of the paper I will attempt to 
sketch such a framework for considering the problem of governance failure, to relate 
this to specific issues pertinent to policing and security, and to consider their 
implications for the debate on governance as it has thus far been played out in 
criminological discourse. 
 
Governance Failure: The Missing Element 
 
We can identify (at least in the modern world) three distinctive modes of social 
coordination, namely those of state-based hierarchy, market-based anarchy and 
network-based heterarchy (Jessop, 1998: 29; see also Thompson, 2003: 22-6). 
Crucially, each of these modes of coordination embodies a distinctive rationality that 
serves to organise action. The rationality of anarchy (ex-post coordination via market 
exchange) is formal and procedural, emphasising efficiency in the pursuit of optimal 
economic outcomes (Ibid: 35). The rationality of hierarchy (ex-ante imperative 
direction) is substantive and goal driven, oriented as it is to the realisation of pre-
determined political and policy aims. The rationality of heterarchy, by contrast, is 
reflexive in character, organised around communicatively managed consent between 
multiple agents (ibid). Much has been written about the tendencies to failure in both 
market-anarchic and state-hierarchic forms of coordination. For example, market 
action fails to realise economically efficient outcomes due to a number of seemingly 
ineradicable ‘imperfections’ or ‘distortions’, such as the formation of monopolies, 
oligopolies, and cartels, as well as sub-optimal outcomes resulting from imperfect 
knowledge. State-hierarchic action fails insofar as its directive mechanisms fail to 
secure the substantive goals established in policy formation (such as security, crime 
reduction, social inclusion, poverty reduction, reductions in mortality and morbidity, 
to name but a few; where such outcomes are explicitly set as policy goals, and action 
palpably fails to realise them, then this can be seen as a failure of strategic action). 
The turn to heterarchic network coordination is often posited as a corrective for the 
tendency to failure in both states and markets. However, as Jessop (1998:43) suggests, 
heterarchic governance, like market anarchy and state hierarchy, has its own in-built 
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tendencies to failure, and concludes that ‘markets, states, and governance all fail’ (see 
also Ormerod, 2005 on failure tendencies in modes of social coordination). This 
should not surprise us as: 
 
‘there is no such thing as complete or total control of an object of set of objects – 
governance is necessarily incomplete and as a necessary consequence must always 
fail’ (Malpas and Wickham 1995: 40). 
 
However, as I shall elaborate below, governance fails in distinctive ways for 
distinctive reasons, different from the tendencies to failure in either states or markets. 
These I will call the Three Failure Tendencies of Heterarchic Governance. 
  
Tendency 1: Failure Due to Inter-Systemic Conflicts and Discordant Rationalities. 
The first tendency to failure arises from the fact that while governance brings together 
both state and market-based actors, they inevitably bring with them their own modes 
of action and embedded rationalities. In other words, market and state actors, upon 
enrolment in a governance network, do not surrender the distinctive rationality that 
organises their actions – market actors will still operate according to a formal and 
procedural rationality oriented to economic efficiency and profit-maximisation, while 
state actors will still operate according to a substantive goal-oriented rationality 
directed by ex-ante policy decisions. Indeed, they cannot do otherwise, as they 
operate within distinctive social systems (Luhmann 1996) that are organised around 
particular logics of action that determine what will count as ‘success’ or ‘failure’ for 
them (thus the capitalist firm cannot surrender its commitment to economic efficiency 
and profit maximisation, for to do so would ensure that it would fail according to the 
logic of competition that defines action within the market as a system; likewise, state 
actors cannot surrender their pursuit of substantive policy goals, as this would lead to 
a failure of the political legitimacy that authorises them to act in the name of an 
electorate). Governance does not and cannot replace these rationalities but brings 
them into direct contestation (Jessop 2003a: 148). Admittedly, one of the key aims of 
network governance is to mediate between different systems; yet insofar as agents 
located within distinctive systemic logics must of necessity act in accordance with 
them, they will define differently both what is relevant or meaningful, and the 
determinate criteria against which success or failure will be measured. To give one 
concrete example in respect of security, the logic of state action will dictate that 
success comprises an incremental eradication of the sources of insecurity (such as 
crime, predation, antisocial behaviour and so on); but for market actors in the business 
of generating profit from the provision of security goods and services, the ongoing 
presence of sources of insecurity is necessary, for without these the demand for goods 
and services cannot be maintained, let alone increased (a point that was not lost on 
Marx, who opined that “crime, through its constantly new methods of attack on 
property, constantly calls into being new methods of defence”, methods that provide a 
welcome source of profit potential for the capitalist entrepreneur (Taylor 1999: 214, 
222). This discordance between different systemic logics will create inevitably 
limitations on inter-systemic coordination, thereby producing a tendency for networks 
to fail in realising a ‘joint product’ via negotiated agreement. 
 
Tendency 2: Failure Due to Intra-Systemic Competition. Problems of conflicting ends 
are not restricted to the inter-systemic domain, as they equally and chronically appear 
on an intra-systemic level within governance networks and between different actors. 
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That is to say, actors from the same system (state, market, voluntary) will often have 
opposing interests such that the aims of all actors cannot be simultaneously realised 
via coordinated action. For example, firms in the business of commercial security 
provision will be in competition for customers with other firms, and will therefore feel 
impelled to curtail communication where competitive advantage is at stake. This can 
lead to ‘knowledge hoarding’ where business-sensitive ideas, information or strategies 
are at stake, since such resources are central to ensuring market success and profit 
maximisation. Problems likewise arise from within the state sphere, where different 
agents (such as government departments) find themselves charged with pursuing 
different and incompatible security goals. To give one recent example, much has been 
made in recent years of the importance of information security in the context of 
greater societal dependence upon computerised information and communication 
technologies, which brings in its wake specific crime problems (such as intellectual 
property theft, computer hacking, unauthorised distribution of business sensitive data, 
violation of personal privacy, and identity theft). Yet in recent years different 
governmental actors have come into conflict around divergent policy goals in this 
domain. The UK’s Home Office has sought to curtail access to sophisticated data 
encryption technologies, as these are viewed as a key tool used by organised criminals 
to hide illegalities. The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) on the other hand has 
the aim of encouraging widespread access to and use of those same technologies, as 
these are viewed as critical for securing business sensitive information and creating 
the consumer confidence necessary for encouraging consumption of computer-based 
services (such as electronic banking)(Yar 2006: 151-2). Thus we see here the ways in 
which divergent policy goals will bring intra-systemic actors into direct conflict as 
they seek to realise aims that are mutually incompatible. Such conflict will inevitably 
curtail or damage efforts at achieving coordinated action via networked agreement. 
 
Tendency 3: Failure Due to Multiple Spatial-Temporal Scales. Even if problems of 
inter- and intra-systemic communication, cooperation and competition could be 
overcome, network governance still faces a tendency to failure arising from the 
multiple spatial and economic scales at which coordinating activity takes place. That 
is to say, the selfsame ‘object’ or ‘set of objects’ will be the target of governance for 
different regulatory or coordinating networks situated at different scales. Thus the 
capacity of any given network to realise its collectively agreed goals will be 
chronically vulnerable to effects creating by governance activity by other networks 
operating on different scales. These effects will emerge from the external environment 
of the network, and thus will not be subject to its coordinating capacities (unless any 
given network is kept eternally and indefinitely open, allowing for enrolment of any 
or all possible relevant actors, which in itself creates further problems insofar as a 
degree of closure is necessary for an agreed range of parties to engage in 
communicative coordination – Jessop 1998: 41).  Thus, for example, efforts to realise 
security goals located at the level of locality will suffer unanticipated effects from 
actions emanating from networks operating at regional, national and trans-national 
scales. Similar problems arise in respect of different temporal horizons within which 
different actors, and networks of actors, operate. For example, state agents may 
operate on the basis of short-term security goals, such as realising a drop in recorded 
crime figures required by political strategies linked to the electoral cycle; these can 
conflict with longer-term initiatives aimed at realising incremental and sustainable 
improvement in the human security environment. Likewise, market actors may be 
divided between short-term goals of profit maximisation and realisation of 
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shareholder value within a defined fiscal or business cycle, and the aim of creating a 
sustainable and stable market environment in the security sector. These factors will 
add a further tendency to governance failure. 
 
The tendencies elaborated above are intended to support the view that failure of 
governance networks is not a contingent possibility but a logical necessity; this 
tendency to failure arises from the very morphology, structure and operating 
rationality of governance itself (just as the failures of state hierarchy and market 
anarchy are a direct consequence of the nature and limits of those modes of 
coordination). One posited solution to the above problems is to institute a 2nd level 
reflexive strategy through which the structural and operating environment of the 
network could be regulated so as to eliminate or minimise problems - what is referred 
to as ‘meta governance’ (Jessop 1998: 42-3) or the ‘governance of governance’ 
(Wood and Shearing: 115-7). However, the recourse to meta-governance is vulnerable 
to the selfsame problems of failure already noted, in that agreement must be reached 
as to the structural and operating principles of a network amongst and between actors 
situated within different systemic logics, with colliding interests and different spatial 
and temporal scales of reasoning. Any attempt to provide these principles in an 
imperative manner (e.g. by the state, or by a supra-national organisation such as the 
EU) traduces the principle of reflexive agreement that is the basis of network 
governance, and recuperates coordination within a hierarchical mode (albeit of a 
‘meta-hierarchical’ kind, one step removed from the business of network governance 
itself). This would be akin, perhaps, to Loader and Walker’s (2006, 2007) notion of 
‘anchored plurality’ in which the state is ‘brought back in’ as the regulatory guarantor 
of rule-governed order within the bounds of whose parameters any subsequent 
polycentric coordination must remain. While this may promise some advantages in 
terms of constraining tendencies towards inter- and intra-systemic conflict, it cannot 
efface other tendencies towards failure, including the disruptive convergence of 
different rationalities and logics of action, or the problems emanating from scalar 
multiplicity. Moreover, questions of efficacy aside, it ceases to be network 
governance in any pure sense, and can be more accurately characterised as a hierarchy 
with quasi-autonomous and distributed functions (as various agents or nodes converge 
upon goals whose procedural determination has been directed by the state or another 
similar meta-governing agent). 
 
The tendency toward governance failure also entails another significant consequence. 
It is commonplace in criminological discussions of governance, networks and nodes 
to see the emergence of such assemblages as something of a fait acompli. For 
example, Wood and Shearing (2006: 153) state that ‘we accept that our world will be 
continued to be governed nodally’ and that ‘whatever happens to strengthen and 
democratise states and supra-states will reshape our nodal world, but it will not make 
it less nodal’. Such judgements carry more than a hint of causal determinism, 
although their grounds are seldom explicitly elaborated. Implicitly, there would 
appear to be a functionalist assumption that, in the face of extended social and 
systemic complexity and differentiation, especially on global scale, erstwhile modes 
of social coordination (especially state hierarchy) find themselves unequal to the task. 
This excess complexity has induced both the ‘crisis of the nation state’ and stimulated 
the emergence of governance networks as a form of functional adaptation. However, 
such conclusions about the inevitability and/or irreversibility of networked 
governance may well be unsustainable if we take seriously the conclusions of Jessop 
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and others that hierarchies, markets and networks all tend to fail. Historically 
speaking, Jessop (1998: 32) notes that different modes of coordination tend to 
predominate at different periods. Thus from the end of WWII till the mid 1970s, the 
dominant mode of social coordination in the UK was that of state hierarchy; this was 
displaced by a turn to market anarchy, with the realisation of goals supposedly being 
realised via the regulative effects of the ’invisible hand’. From the start of the 1990s 
to the present, the dominant preference has oriented increasingly towards heterarchic 
governance. These changes should not, however, be viewed as a logical and uniform 
line of succession. Transitions from one mode to another are stimulated as the 
particular kinds of failure that a given mode of coordination are prone to accrue. The 
move to a different mode cannot present an opportunity to erase failure, as we have 
already noted that all such modes have failure tendencies. Rather, what matters is that 
a successor mode will fail in a manner different to its predecessor and with different 
negative effects. Thus the turn to markets from the mid 1970s did not and could not do 
away with failure, but did succeed in curtailing the accumulation of the particular 
kinds of failure associated with hierarchical direction. The displacement of the ‘free 
market experiment’ of the 1980s by network governance likewise serves to prevent 
further accretion of the specific negative outcomes associated with market failure. On 
this view: 
 
‘The discovery of governance could mark a fresh revolution in this process – a simple cyclical 
response to past failures (especially those linked to attempts to manage the emerging crisis of 
Atlantic Fordism from the mid-1970s) and, more recently, market failure (and its associated 
crisis in corporate governance)’ (Jessop 1998: 32) 
 
Logically then, at some point the undesirable effects of governance failure will accrue 
to such an extent that another mode of social coordination will displace it from pre-
eminence. Consequently, the criminological debate on crime, policing and human 
security should not assume that network or nodal governance is ‘here to stay’, and 
that we are left only with the choices of either pragmatic adaptation to new realities, 
or organising a political project of resistance that seeks to return the state to its former 
position of primacy. Rather, it may well be that, as a direct consequence of failure 
tendencies, governance will eventually ‘have had its day’ and will be displaced in turn 
by another mode of social coordination that does not fail in the same way. Whether 
this might be state hierarchy, market anarchy, or some as yet unanticipated new mode 




In this article I have traced the development of the ‘governance of policing and 
security’ debate in criminology over the past quarter century. I have suggested that it 
has been characterised by descriptive accordance, explanatory confluence and 
normative dissonance, and that the latter has been a dominant concern across recent 
contributions from a wide range of scholars. However, I have argued that the 
contributions as a whole have neglected to systematically address a crucial issue, 
namely that of the functional adequacy of network or nodal governance as such, and 
the inherent limits (or tendencies towards ‘governance failure’) that inevitably arise 
from the structure, morphology and logic of such coordination processes. I have 
attempted here to explicate three distinctive problems that cause governance to fail, 
and have sought to relate these to problem specific to policing and security. If, indeed, 
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network heterarchy (like state hierarchy and market anarchy) necessarily tends to 
failure, then this has a number of implications for the ways in which criminology 
thinks about the governance of security. Firstly, it cannot be taken for granted that 
network (or nodal) governance will be functionally efficacious, and move on to 
normatively assess and/or critique its outcomes. Rather, the specific instances of 
failure in this domain need to be identified, acknowledged and carefully analysed. 
Secondly, if the tendencies towards failure are a chronic feature of governance 
networks, then more careful attention needs to be directed towards proposals for 
‘meta governance’ or the ‘governance of governance’, which are often adduced as a 
‘solution’ for problems that may be encountered. Thirdly, if failure tendencies (across 
all modes of social coordination) incite a cyclical rotation between different modes, 
then criminologists need to question the assumption that the shift to network 
governance will remain a permanent or enduring configuration of the security 
environment. The aim here has been to reframe the debate away from its current 
preoccupation with normative problems and towards a sociological appreciation of 
other salient dimensions of governance that have been heretofore largely overlooked. 
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i
  This is not to suggest, however, that the work of these three writers forms a seamless 
continuity, or that there are not also agreements as well as disagreements between ‘governance 
sceptics’ and ‘governance enthusiasts’. However, I feel that a broad classification or division of this 
kind can nonetheless serve a useful heuristic purpose when over-viewing the debate. 
ii
  Crawford (2003) exemplifies an unusual scepticism in this regard, insisting upon a more 
detailed empirical mapping of trends on the governance of security before moving on to consider what, 
if any, normative judgements can be made. 
